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Cheap Talk in the Classroom
Lydia Mechtenberg0




In this paper, I o¤er a theoretical explanation of the robust gen-
der di¤erences in educational achievement distributions of school chil-
dren. I consider a one shot cheap talk game with two di¤erent types
of senders (biased teachers and fair teachers), two types of receivers
(normaland specialpupils) and uncertainty about the sender type
on the side of the receiver. I demonstrate that the group of pupils
who, in expectation, get either too much or too little encouragement
will have less top achievers and a lower average achievement than the
group of pupils who get a more accurate feedback message, even if the
prior talent distribution is the same for both groups of pupils.
Keywords: Cheap talk, Education, Discrimination, Gender.
JEL Classication: D82, I21, J16.
1 Introduction
Nearly all existing data on cognitive achievement of school children reveal
the same phenomenon: Girls are on average better in reading, but boys out-
perform girls in math and sciences.1 In almost all OECD countries, average
0I thank Helmut Bester, Annette Boom, Paul Heidhues, Kai A. Konrad, Daniel Kräh-
mer, Dorothea Kübler, Johannes Münster, Kerstin Puschke, Roland Strausz, Elmar Wolf-
stetter and the audience at the ESWC 2005 for valuable comments on earlier versions
of this paper. The usual caveat applies. This research was supported by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 Economic Risk. I also thank the Econo-
metric Society for a travel grant.
1See for example the TIMSS 2000 Report and the PISA-USA 2003 Report.
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PISA scale scores in mathematics are higher for males than for females.2
Besides, signicantly more males than females exceed the magnitude of the
highest prociency level in mathematics. In the U.S., for example, 2.8 per-
cent of 15-years-old males and only 1.2 percent of fteen-years-old females
perform at Level 6 in mathematics, the highest possible prociency level in
PISA 2003. At moderate prociency levels, females are more strongly repre-
sented.3
Skills in math and sciences may be regarded as one major part of the kind
of human capital that drives innovation and for which employers are willing
to pay top wages. Thus, the question why girls have lower top and average
achievements than boys in math and sciences should not only interest those
who want to equalize opportunities of the sexes. But it should also attract
the attention of those who want to enhance the kinds of human capital that
are most important from a welfare perspective.
Gender di¤erences in achievement may be due to the interaction between
teachers and pupils. Many psychological studies prove that teacher expec-
tations are strongly correlated with the e¤ort choice of pupils.4 The more a
teacher expects from the pupil, the better does the latter perform. Generally,
this can either be due to the accuracy of teacher expectations, or to some
self-fullling prophecy.
Self-fullling prophecies in the classroom have the following structure:
First, the teacher forms di¤erent expectations with regard to di¤erent pupils.
Second, he treats pupils di¤erently according to his expectations. Third,
pupils perform di¤erently because of this di¤erential treatment.5 As Jussim
(2005) argues, self-fullling prophecies do occur in the classroom.
Thus, teacher expectations as such can have strong e¤ects on pupils
achievement. But still, the exact mechanisms by which teachers can and
do inuence their pupilssuccess are far from clear. Therefore, a thorough
theoretical analysis might be helpful.6
2See, for instance, the PISA 2003 Report, Figure 2.18.
3For the comparison of achievement distributions for males and females, compare Table
2.5b in the PISA 2000 and 2003 Reports.
4See for example Alvidrez and Weinstein (1999), Cli¤ord and Walster (1973), Clifton
et al. (1986), Hoge and Butcher (1984), Jussim (1989), the seminal paper of Rosenthal
and Jacobson (1968) and, for an economic paper, Lavy (2004).
5See Trouilloud et al. (2002), p. 591.
6The means and consequences of agents manipulating other agentsself-conndence are
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In the current paper, I model the interaction between teachers, who are
either biased or fair, and their pupils as a cheap talk game. Teachers insinuate
to their pupils certain beliefs about their ability. The pupils, in their turn,
react by appropriately choosing their e¤ort.
Assuming complementarity between talent and e¤ort, I nd that the
group of pupils who, in expectation, get either too much or too little en-
couragement will have less top achievers and a lower average achievement
than the group of pupils who get a more accurate feedback message. This
holds true even if the prior talent distribution is the same for both groups of
pupils. Biased feedback regardless of the direction of the bias will always
reduce top and average achievement.
This result can explain the robust gender di¤erences in educational achieve-
ment distributions of school children. Besides, the model can be used to ex-
plain similar di¤erences in top and average achievement between any other
two social groups of pupils, like upper class and lower class children.
Obviously, the current paper is related to the literature on discrimination,
starting with Gary Beckers 1957 book on taste discrimination, and to the
literature on cheap talk that is based on Crawford and Sobel (1982).
Similar to the literature on taste discrimination, I assume that the dis-
criminatory behavior in question has its roots in the preferences of those who
exhibit this behavior. But my paper di¤ers from existing taste discrimination
models in at least two ways.
First, it is not discrimination on the labour market which I consider, but
discrimination in the classroom. Di¤erent from employers, teachers have less
possibilities of inuencing their pupilsopportunities. They are, for example,
generally not in the position to individually select pupils for their classes. My
paper shows that anyway, such far-reaching decision rights are unnecessary
for discrimination to have its e¤ects: Cheap talk su¢ ces.
Second, I do not restrict my analysis to negative taste discrimination, i.e.
discrimination resulting from aversion against specic social groups. Instead,
I explore the consequences of both negative and positive taste discrimination
in the classroom. The inclusion of favoritism7 into my analysis allows me
to demonstrate that in educational settings, being favoured is not in the
still not widely discussed in economics. One notable exception are Benabou and Tirole
(2002).
7For an economic paper on favouritism in organizations, see Prendergast and Topel
(1996).
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least better than being the victim of negative discrimination. This is an-
other important di¤erence between discrimination on the labour market and
discrimination in the classroom.
Because I model both biased and fair teachers to engage in the cheap talk
game with their pupils, my paper is closely related to the literature on cheap
talk with two types of senders. As in Benabou and Laroque (1992), Morris
(2001) and Sobel (1985), I consider a cheap talk game where the receiver
of the message (the pupil, in my model) does not observe the type of the
sender. Thus, the receiver does not know in advance if he faces a sender
whose preferences are perfectly aligned to his own preferences or if he gets
the message from a sender who pursuits completely di¤erent ends.
But my paper di¤ers from the cited ones in several respects. First, I
do not only consider two types of senders, but also two types of receivers,
namely "normal" and "special" pupils, i.e. boys and girls. Second, in my
model the possible states of the world that the sender should report to the
receiver are characteristics of the receiver himself. They are realizations of
the talent variable. Third, the applications of our models are completely
di¤erent. Benabou and Laroque (1992), Morris (2001) and Sobel (1985)
explore the consequences of reputational concerns of agents who have to
report their signals to the principal in a repeated cheap talk game. By
contrast, I do not consider reputational concerns at all. Instead, I focus on
the comparison of the distributions of e¤ort and achievement of normal
pupils with the corresponding distributions of pupils who are positively or
negatively discriminated.
The paper is organized as follows. In the subsequent section, I will present
the model. Then, I will analyze the equilibrium with favoritism (section III)
and the equilibrium with negative discrimination (section IV). In section V,
I will summarize the results.
2 The Model
The timing and information structure of the model is as follows. At the
beginning of the game, nature draws the social type t of the pupils. A pupil
can be either normal or special, t 2 fn; spg. Within the scope of the
current application of the model, a "normal" pupil is a boy, and a "special"
4
pupil is a girl. 8 Whether a pupil is normal or special is common
knowledge.
Then, nature draws the talent types of the pupils. The talent variable
 of a pupil can either be 1 or k, with 0 < k < 1. The prior probability
of being highly talented ( = 1) is  = 1
2
in both social groups. This prior
distribution of talent is common knowledge, but neither pupils nor teachers
can observe the pupilstalent directly.
Nature also draws the type  of the teachers. A teacher can either be
fair or biased,  2 ff; bg. Teachers know their type, but the pupils
cannot observe it. Next, pupils and teachers are randomly paired, so that
the probability that a given pupil is matched with a biased teacher is ,
which is common knowledge.
Then, each teacher (and only the teacher) observes a noisy signal s 2
fk; 1g about the talent of his pupil, where the probability  that the signal







The teacher has to report his signal to his pupil, but he may also lie.
Thus, the message space is fk; 1g. After having received the message m, the
pupil updates his or her belief about his or her talent according to Bayes
Rule taking into account the probability that the teacher lied. Then, the
pupil chooses e¤ort e. If the pupil is highly talented, his or her payo¤ will
be (e  e2), where e2 measures psychic e¤ort costs. If the pupil has only low
talent, his or her payo¤ will be (ke  e2).
The pupils choice of e¤ort will maximize his or her expected utility. In
each equilibrium with information transmission, e¤ort choice will depend on
the message m.
After the pupil has received the message and has chosen e¤ort, his or her
payo¤, that is to say the intellectual outcome e and the e¤ort costs e2, are
realized, and the game ends.
Two comments about these basic assumptions are appropriate. First, the
assumption of uniform prior talent distribution can be justied. If nothing is
known about the talent of the pupils, neither to them nor to their teachers, it
is adequate for rational individuals to adopt uniformly distributed priors. Be-
sides, in the bivariate case the uniform distribution is a good approximation
8Obviously, the distinction between "normal" and "special" can also be applied di¤er-
ently. For example, "normal" and "special" pupils could be upper-class and lower-class
children, respectively.
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of the normal distribution, which has been proved to be the true distribution
of IQ among pupils.
Second, the assumption that the probability  of being highly talented is
equal in both social groups of the pupils will help demonstrate the following
point: Even if all pupils have the same prior probability of being highly tal-
ented, their posterior subjective talent probabilities and their achievements
will di¤er systematically due to biased feedback.9
2.1 Preferences and individual decision making
Given the basic structure of the model described above, the preferences of
pupils and teachers are obvious. The expected utility of a pupil of type t will
be described as









where t (m) represents the pupils posterior subjective probability of being
highly talented, given the message m and the social type t 2 fn; spg.
Accordingly, the pupils optimal e¤ort choice is given by
et = et (m) =
1
2
[t (m) (1  k) + k] (2)
Not only the message m, but also the social type (i.e. gender) of the
pupil determines the pupils e¤ort choice via the posterior subjective talent
probability. This is because I assume that in expectation, teachers treat the
two di¤erent groups of pupils di¤erently. With regard to the e¤ort choice of
a pupil within the "normal" group, fair and biased teachers have the same
altruistic preferences. Teacherspreferences are perfectly aligned with those
of the normalpupils. But with regard to a "special" pupils e¤ort choice,
the preferences of the two types of teachers di¤er. "Special" pupils are special
because they are treated in a special way by biased teachers. I assume that
a biased teacher gives a di¤erent weight to a specialpupils success than
this pupil herself.
Thus, the preferences of the teachers can be described as follows. By the
choice of their message m, fair teachers always maximize
9If the assumption of equal prior talent distribution was replaced by the assumption
that any pupil in the "normal" group has a higher prior probability of being highly talented
than any pupil in the "special" group, the qualitative results would not change.
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Uf = p (s)
 
et (m)  et (m)2

+ (1  p (s))
 
ket (m)  et (m)2

(3)
for all t with t 2 fn; spg, where the expression p (s) symbolizes the probability
that the pupil is highly talented, given the signal s 2 f1; kg that the teacher
has received. In any equilibrium with information transmission, that is to
say in any equilibrium where et (1) > et (k)8t, the fair teacher will send the
good message, namelym = 1, if t (1)+t (k) < 2p (s), and the bad message,
namely m = k, if t (1) + t (k) > 2p (s).
By contrast, biased teachers maximize
Ub = p(s)
 
tet (m)  et (m)
2+ (1  p (s))  tket (m)  et (m)2 :
I assume that t = 1 for t = n, t = L < 1 if t = sp and if the biased
teachers are negatively biased against "special" pupils, and t = H > 1 if
t = sp and if the "special" pupils are favorites of the biased teachers.
The di¤erence in weighting of success between biased teachers and "spe-
cial" pupils can be interpreted as a di¤erence in aspiration level. A teacher
who weights the success of his pupil by H is satised with his pupils achieve-
ment much earlier than the pupil herself. He is, from the perspective of the
pupil, too nice, because his aspiration level with regard to "special" pupils
is too low. If we think of "special" pupils as girls, this could mean that in
the eyes of the biased teachers, girls should be contended with less success
than boys because anyway, they will not have to work as scientists. For very
similar reasons, a biased teacher could come by a low aspiration level with
regard to "special" pupils, i.e. girls, weighting their success only by L. If a
girl will not be expected to develop further her scientic skills after school,
then she must be much smarter than a boy in order to justify the e¤ort that
she invests into her scientic education in school. The reason is that her
e¤ort might turn out to be wasted if the girl is not smart enough to stick to
her ambitions against all oppositions.
The cuto¤-level of , at which a biased teacher matched with the pupil i
would be indi¤erent between the good and the bad message, is
t (s) =
et (1) + et (k)
k + p (s) (1  k) :
7
For t > t (s), the biased teacher would send the good message, whereas
for t < t (s), he would express negative feedback. If t (1) < t < t (k),
the biased teachers would always report their signals truthfully. I will not
consider this possibility. Instead, I will either assume that for t = sp, t =
H > t (k), or I will assume that t = L < t (1). In the rst case, the biased
teacher will always praise his "special" pupil, regardless of the signal which
he received. This case will be called favoritism. In the second case, the biased
teacher, if matched with a "special" pupil, will always send the bad message,
again regardless of his signal. This is the case of negative discrimination.
Thus, biased teachers have a strong incentive to behave di¤erently than fair
teachers, either because they want to praise more or because they want to
criticise more.
In the next section, I will analyse such pure strategy equilibria of the
game that are characterized by this kind of behavior of biased teachers.
2.2 Equilibria with information transmission
The equilibrium concept which applies to the game is that of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium: Given their beliefs, teachers and pupils must make optimal
decisions at all information sets; and they must update their beliefs according
to Bayes rule whenever that is dened.
As in any cheap talk game, equilibria without information transmission,
so-called babbling equilibria, exist. Pooling equilibria where both types of
teachers always praise or always criticise are such babbling equilibria. Be-
sides, all possible pooling equilibria of the game are of this kind. The reason is
easy to see. It has been assumed that biased teachers either always praise or
always criticise a "special" pupil, depending on whether t = H or t = L.
Thus, the only possibility of fair and biased teachers exhibiting the same be-
havior is that both types of teachers either always praise or always criticise
"special" pupils.
I will ignore these babbling equilibria because they are unplausible de-
scriptions of what happens in the classroom. In school, pupils learn at least
something about their own abilities from their teachers. Consequently, only
separating equilibria, i.e. equilibria where the two types of teachers act dif-
ferently, remain to be considered. Among these, I ignore "mirror" equilibria
where only the meanings of the messages are reversed. For example, an
equilibrium in which a given type always lies about his signal mirrors the
equilibrium in which the same type always tells the truth. In the equilibrium
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in which a given type always lies, the receiver of the message would simply
assign the opposite meanings to the messages of this type. Thus, both equi-
libria are identical with regard to incentives and non-verbal behavior. I will
consider only such separating equilibria in which the messages of the teachers
have their ordinary meanings.
Obviously, fair and biased teachers will separate only with regard to "spe-
cial" pupils, not with regard to "normal" pupils, because their preferences
concerning "normal" pupils are the same. Thus, there are altogether two
conceivable separating equilibria in pure strategies of the game that remain
to be analysed.
In the rst conceivable separating equilibrium, the fair teachers always
report their signal truthfully whereas the biased teachers always praise a
"special" pupil. This would be the separating pure strategy equilibrium in
the case of favoritism. In the case of negative discrimination, the separating
pure strategy equilibrium would be that still, the fair teachers always report
their signal honestly, but the biased teachers, if matched with a "special"
pupil, always criticise her. Indeed, these are the two separating equilibria
in pure strategies of the game, given the assumptions on t. The above
considerations are summarized in
Lemma: Let mt denote the message m that a teacher of type
 2 ff; bg sends to the pupil of type t. Then, the following holds: If t =
H > t (k) or t = L < t (1) for t = sp and t = 1 for t = n, there
exists a separating equilibrium in pure strategies in which mt = s 8t if and
only if either  = f or both t = n and  = b. In the equilibrium with
t = H > t (k), m

t = 1 for t = sp if and only if  = b. In the equilibrium
with t = L < t (1), m

t = k for t = sp if and only if  = b.
Proof: See Appendix. 
3 Favoritism in the classroom
Consider the situation with favoritism. Only the fair teachers report their
signal honestly to both kinds of pupils, whereas the biased teachers are honest
only to the "normal" pupils but always praise "special" pupils. What, now,
will be the e¤ect of favoritism with regard to "special" pupils? How will the
distribution of their e¤ort and their achievement di¤er from the distributions
of the "normal" pupilse¤ort and achievement?
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3.1 E¤ort and achievement of "normal" pupils
Whatever message a "normal" pupil gets, he rightly believes it to be the true
report of the teachers signal. Thus, if he gets a good message, he believes





[k +  (1  k)] (4)
If instead he gets a bad message, he believes himself to be highly talented
only with probability n (k) = p (k) = 1   . The e¤ort level which he




[1   (1  k)] (5)
Among the highly talented "normal" pupils, those about whom the signal
was correct, namely a fraction ; choose high e¤ort en (1), and those about
whom the signal was wrong, that is to say a fraction (1  ), choose low
e¤ort en (k). Thus, the average e¤ort and average achievement of the highly
talented "normal" pupils is





[k +  (1  k)] + (1  ) 1
2
[1   (1  k)] :
Among the "normal" pupils of low talent, a fraction (1  ) invests high
e¤ort en (1), whereas a fraction  invests low e¤ort en (k). Thus, the average
e¤ort of lowly talented "normal" pupils is




[k +  (1  k)] + 1
2
[1   (1  k)] ;
whereas their average achievement is only




[k +  (1  k)] + k1
2
[1   (1  k)] :
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3.2 E¤ort and achievement of favorites
In the equilibrium with favoritism, the only message about her talent that
a "special" pupil will fully believe to be honest is the negative one. If a
"special" pupil is told to be lowly talented, she will attach to the possibility
of being highly talented the probability sp (k) = p (k) = 1   . Like the
"normal" pupil in her situation, she will choose low e¤ort esp (k) = en (k).
But if a "special" pupil is praised by her teacher, she only partly believes him,
because she has to take into account the probability with which she is a lowly
talented pupil matched with a biased teacher. Thus, the probability which
she assigns to the fact that she is highly talented is only sp (1) =
+(1 )
1+
with p (k) < sp (1) < p (1). Accordingly, she chooses lower e¤ort than the












en (k) < esp (1) < en (1) :
Among the talented "special" pupils, a fraction [ +  (1  )], namely
those about whom the signal was true and those about whom the signal was
wrong but who are matched with a biased teacher, get the good message
and choose middle e¤ort esp (1). This group of pupils consists of . Those
with a wrong signal but a fair teacher, namely a fraction (1  ) (1  ), get
the bad message and choose low e¤ort en (k). Thus, the average e¤ort and
average achievement of highly talented "special" pupils amounts to
[ +  (1  )] esp (1) + (1  ) (1  ) en (k) (10)
which equals








+(1  ) (1  ) 1
2
[1   (1  k)] :
The lowly talented "special" pupils who choose middle e¤ort esp (1) are
rstly those about whom the signal was wrongly saying that they are talented.
Secondly, they are those who were characterized correctly by the signal but
who are matched with a biased teacher. Thus, a fraction [(1  ) + ] of
the lowly talented "special" pupils choose esp (1). Low e¤ort en (k) is chosen
by those about whom the signal was right and who are matched with a fair
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teacher, that is to say by a fraction (1  ). Consequently, the average
e¤ort of the lowly talented "special" pupils is
[(1  ) + ] esp (1) + (1  )en (k) (11)
which equals










[1   (1  k)] ;
whereas their average achievement amounts to
[(1  ) + ] kesp (1) + (1  ) ken (k) (12)
or










[1   (1  k)] :
3.3 Distributional e¤ects of favoritism
Comparing the e¤ort distribution of the "normal" pupils with the one of
the "special" pupils leads to an observation which might be counterintuitive:
Regardless of the question whether or not they are highly talented in reality
and no matter with what kind of teacher they are matched, "special" pupils
never become top achievers in a situation where they are potential favorites.
None of them chooses the highest e¤ort en (1). At the same time, they have
less bottom achievers than the group of "normal" pupils. Whereas a fraction
(1  ) of the highly talented and a fraction  of the lowly talented "normal"
pupils choose the lowest e¤ort en (k), only a fraction (1  ) (1  ) of the
highly talented "special" pupils and a fraction (1  ) of the lowly talented
"special" pupils do so. This result is summarized in
Proposition 1: Favoritism creates mediocrity. The fact that a pos-
itive percentage of teachers will always praise a "special" pupil entails that
"special" pupils have less top achievers and less bottom achievers but more
middle achievers than "normal" pupils.10
10Of course, this result has been derived only for the bivariate case. It would be an
interesting task for further research to check whether this result is robust also in a model
with continuous type space.
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This result is already of some interest, because the lack of top achievers
among the group of "special" pupils is likely to lead to a corresponding
absence of former "special" pupils from the societys elite later on. If girls
are treated as potential favorites at school, the lack of women on the top
steps of the job ladder might be at least partly due to the e¤ect described in
Proposition 1.
Nevertheless, this rst observation is not su¢ cient. In order to fully
understand the distributional e¤ects of favoritism in school, we have still to
compare average e¤ort and average achievement of "normal" and "special"
pupils.
Consider rst the highly talented pupils. Subtracting (6) from (10), we
get the di¤erence in e¤ort and achievement between the "special" and the








2 (1 + )
[4 (1  )  1] (14)
Because  > 1
2
, this equation directly implies that 4H is negative.
Proposition 2: In the equilibrium with favoritism, the average e¤ort
and achievement of highly talented "special" pupils is lower than the average
e¤ort and achievement of highly talented "normal" pupils.
The intuition behind this e¤ect is the following. Every "special" pupil
anticipates the possibility of being matched with an all-too friendly teacher.
This makes all of them who get a good message, including those whom their
teachers suspect to be highly talented, suspicious about their praise. They
internalize the message about their talent only partly. Indeed, sometimes
biased feedback increases e¤ort. Among the highly talented pupils, there are
some about whom the signal was wrong and who are matched with a biased
teacher. They invest more into their education than they would have done
if their teacher were fair, telling them the unpleasant news about the signal
which he received. But those pupils make up far less than half of the group
of highly talented "special" pupils, because the signal is wrong only with a
probability less than one-half and because the probability of being matched
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with a biased teacher is less than one. The other part of the highly talented
"special" pupils are those about whose talent the signal has been right and
who wrongly distrust the praise that they get. They choose lower e¤ort than
they would have done, if they did not take into account the possibility of
being lied to. Because they make up the main part of the highly talented
"special" pupils, this negative e¤ect prevails.
Consider now the lowly talented pupils. Subtracting (8) from (12), one
gets the di¤erence in average achievements between "special" and "normal"
pupils of low talent, which will be described as
4L = k [(1  ) + ] esp (1)  k (1  ) en (1)  ken (k) (15)
Dividing by k yields the corresponding di¤erence in average e¤ort:
1
k
4L = [(1  ) + ] esp (1)  (1  ) en (1)  en (k) (16)
Substituting for esp (1), en (1) and en (k) and simplifying yields the fol-




2 (1 + )






2 (1 + )
[1  4 (1  )] (18)
Because  > 1
2
, the di¤erence 4L in average achievement between lowly
talented "special" and "normal" pupils is positive; so the lowly talented
favorites outank the lowly talented "normal" pupils.
Proposition 3: In the equilibrium with favoritism, average e¤ort
and achievement of lowly talented "special" pupils is higher than average
e¤ort and achievement of lowly talented "normal" pupils.
The mechanism which drives this result can be explained as follows. Al-
though "special" pupils mistrust their teacher if he praises them, they partly
internalize the good message, because they can never know for sure that they
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are lied to. Thus, by praising each "special" pupil regardless of their signal,
the biased teachers can induce those whom they suspect to be lowly talented
to choose higher e¤ort than they would have done if they had heard the
truth about the teachers signal. Of course, there are also those lowly tal-
ented "special" pupils about whose talent the signal has been wrong. They
invest less than they would have done if they had not taken into account the
possibility of being lied to. But the e¤ect of increasing e¤ort prevails among
the lowly talented "special" pupils.
Obviously, there are two countervailing e¤ects of favoritism that inu-
ence total average e¤ort and total average achievement: On the one hand,
favoritism leads to a decrease of average e¤ort spent by highly talented pupils
who anticipate the possibility of hearing nice lies about their talent. On the
other hand, average e¤ort and achievement of lowly talented pupils who know
themselves to be potentially favored increase. Thus, the question has to be
answered what the total e¤ect of favoritism will be.
The total di¤erence in average e¤ort between "special" and "normal"





which can directly be shown to equal zero by adding the right hand sides of
(24) and (28). From this, the result in Proposition 4 follows.
Proposition 4: Favoritism has no e¤ect on total average e¤ort. The
decrease of average e¤ort exerted by highly talented pupils in reaction to
anticipated favoritism and the increase of average e¤ort invested by lowly
talented pupils exactly cancel out.
But far more important than the total e¤ect on average e¤ort is the






Proposition 5: Favoritism decreases average achievement of those
pupils who know themselves to be potential favorites.
The reason for this result is that rst, the e¤ects of favoritism on average
e¤ort of highly and lowly talented "special" pupils cancel out. But second,
the increase in average e¤ort of the lowly talented does only partly translate
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into a corresponding increase in average achievement, whereas the decrease in
average e¤ort of the highly talented is fully reected in a decrease of average
achievement.
Thus, the assumption that a fraction of teachers favors girls over boys in
math and science classes in the way described can explain the observed fact
that, on average, boys outperform girls in math and sciences. Besides, our
result shows that favoritism in the form of excessive praise is not the means
with which one could support a given group of pupils. On the contrary,
anticipation of favoritism leads to distrust in praise and ine¢ ciently low
e¤ort by the highly talented.
Therefore, it is an interesting question how the di¤erence in average
achievement between "special" and "normal" highly talented and lowly tal-
ented pupils varies with the percentage of biased teachers, , the signal qual-
ity  and the talent of the lowly talented, k.
Di¤erentiating4H and4L with respect to these parameters yields results
that are summarized in
Proposition 6: The absolute value of the di¤erence 4H in average
achievement between "special" and "normal" highly talented pupils (i) in-
creases with the percentage of biased teachers, , (ii) increases with the signal
quality  and (iii) decreases with increasing talent k of the lowly talented.
The di¤erence 4L in average achievement between "special" and "normal"
lowly talented pupils (iv) decreases with the percentage  of biased teachers,
(v) increases with the signal quality  and (vi) with the talent k as long as
k < 1
2
, whereas (vii) it decreases with increasing k if k > 1
2
. (viii) The total
di¤erence in average achievement increases with  and  and decreases with
growing k:
Proof: See Appendix. 
Most interestingly, an improvement of signal quality does not compensate
for the negative discrimination e¤ect of favoritism on the favored pupils.
On the contrary, it enforces the distance in average achievement between
"special" and "normal" pupils. The less noisy the signal is, the more e¤ective
is the additional noise introduced into the messages by the fact that a positive
percentage of teachers is biased. Thus, implementing more objective test
methods does not reduce the relative discrimination e¤ects at all; instead,
this reaction to the problem even aggravates it.
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Of course, the assumption of favoritism might be contested. Anecdotal
evidence seems to support the contrary assumption, namely that teachers
give girls too little praise in math and science classes. Therefore, I will inves-
tigate in the following section the consequences of too little encouragement,
which I will call negative discrimination.
4 Negative discrimination in the classroom
In the situation with negative discrimination, the biased teachers tell all "spe-
cial" pupils with whom they are matched that they are only lowly talented,
no matter what their signals tell them. On the behavior of "normal" pupils,
this treatment of their classmates has no e¤ect, and the results from section
2.1 still apply. But the "special" pupils anticipate the potential bias of their
teachers and react to it.
4.1 E¤ort and achievement of discriminated pupils
Contrary to the situation with favoritism, "special" pupils now fully believe
only the good message. If they are told that they are highly talented, they
infer that they are matched with a fair teacher who has reported his signal
honestly. Thus, those "special" pupils who get a good message attach to the
possibility of being highly talented the probability sp (1) = p (1) = . Like
the "normal" pupils who receive good news about their talent, they choose
high e¤ort en (1). But if a "special" pupil is told to be only lowly talented,
she suspects that her teacher might be biased and may lie to her. Thus, a
"special" pupil who gets a bad message still assigns to the possibility of being
highly talented the probability sp (k) =
+(1 )
1+
with p (k) < sp (k) <
p (1). Accordingly, she reacts to the bad message with higher e¤ort than the










en (k) < esp (k) < en (1) :
Consider now the highly talented "special" pupils. Those of them about
whom the signal was correct and who are matched with a fair teacher, namely
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a fraction (1  ), get a good message and choose high e¤ort en (1). The
others are either matched with teachers who received a wrong signal anyway,
or they have a biased teacher who, despite having received the correct sig-
nal, gives negative feedback. So a fraction [(1  ) + ] of highly talented
"special" pupils gets the bad message and chooses middle e¤ort esp (k). Con-
sequently, the average e¤ort and achievement of highly talented "special"
pupils faced with potential negative discrimination amounts to




[k +  (1  k)] + [(1  ) + ] 1
2






Among the lowly talented "special" pupils, those whose teachers are fair
but received a wrong signal, that is to say a fraction (1  ) (1  ), get
a good message about their talent and therefore choose high e¤ort en (1).
By contrast, those about whom the signal was correct and those who are
matched with a biased teacher who, in spite of having received a wrong sig-
nal, sends the bad message, get bad news about their talent. Thus, a fraction
[ +  (1  )] of the lowly talented "special" pupils chooses only middle ef-
fort esp (k). Accordingly, the average e¤ort of lowly talented "special" pupils
who are faced with potential negative discrimination amounts to
(1  ) (1  ) en (1) + [ +  (1  )] esp (k) (20)
or
(1  ) (1  ) 1
2
[k +  (1  k)]+[ +  (1  )] 1
2






Consequently, their average achievement is
(1  ) (1  ) ken (1) + [ +  (1  )] kesp (k) (21)
or
(1  ) (1  ) k1
2
[k +  (1  k)]+[ +  (1  )] k1
2







4.2 Distributional e¤ects of negative discrimination
Comparison of the e¤ort and achievement distributions of "normal" and "spe-
cial" pupils in the negative discrimination equilibrium leads to the same
rst observation as the corresponding comparison in the equilibrium with
favoritism. Like favoritism, negative discrimination compresses the e¤ort
and achievement distribution. No matter what their actual talent and the
signals are - "special" pupils will never be bottom achievers. None of them
chooses low e¤ort en (k). But at the same time, "special" pupils also have less
top achievers than "normal" pupils. Whereas among the "normal" pupils,
a fraction  of the highly talented and a fraction (1  ) of the lowly tal-
ented choose high e¤ort en (1), among the "special" pupils, this e¤ort level
is chosen only by a fraction (1  ) of the highly talented and a fraction
(1  ) (1  ) of the lowly talented. This observation can be summarized
in
Proposition 7: Like favoritism, negative discrimination creates medi-
ocrity. The fact that a positive percentage of teachers will always reprimand
a "special" pupil entails that "special" pupils have less top achievers and less
bottom achievers but more middle achievers than "normal" pupils.
What, now, will be the e¤ect of negative discrimination on average e¤ort
and achievement? Subtracting (6) from (20), one gets the di¤erence in aver-
age e¤ort and achievement of highly talented "special" and normal" pupils,
which is




2 (1 + )
[4 (1  )  1] (23)
One can directly see from this equation that, as in the equilibrium with
favoritism, 4H is negative, because  > 12 . Besides, (24) is identical with
(14). Thus, favoritism and negative discrimination have precisely the same
e¤ect on average achievement of highly talented pupils.
Proposition 8: Like the equilibrium with favoritism, the equilib-
rium with negative discrimination is characterized by the fact that average
e¤ort and achievement of highly talented "special" pupils is lower than av-
erage e¤ort and achievement of highly talented "normal" pupils.
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What is the intuition behind this result? The existence of negative dis-
crimination has two e¤ects on "special" pupils of high talent. On the one
hand, all highly talented "special" pupils about whom the signal was wrong
and who therefore get a bad message will choose higher e¤ort than "normal"
pupils who got a bad message. The reason is that no "special" pupil will
fully believe bad news about her talent. But on the other hand, also more
highly talented "special" pupils than highly talented "normal" pupils get a
bad message, and those among them about whom the signal was right will
choose lower e¤ort than they would have done if their teacher had been fair.
As long as the probability of the signals being correct exceeds one-half, the
second e¤ect is the dominating one.
Consider now the lowly talented "special" pupils. If one subtracts (8)
from (22), one gets the di¤erence in average achievement between lowly tal-
ented "special" and "normal" pupils, namely
4L = [ +  (1  )] kesp (k)   (1  ) ken (1)  ken (k) (24)
and accordingly, the corresponding di¤erence in average achievement:
1
k
4L = [ +  (1  )] esp (k)   (1  ) en (1)  en (k) (25)
If one substitutes for esp (k), en (1) and en (k) and simplies the resulting
expressions, one gets the following equations for 4L and 1k4L:
4L =
k (1  k)
2 (1 + )






2 (1 + )
[1  4 (1  )] (27)
As one can directly see from (27) and (28), 4L and 1k4L are positive for
all  in the domain. Moreover, because (27) and (28) are identical with (17)
and (18), the e¤ect on average achievement of lowly talented "special" pupils
is precisely the same in the equilibrium with negative discrimination as in
the equilibrium with favoritism.
Proposition 9: Like the equilibrium with favoritism, the equilib-
rium with negative discrimination is characterized by the fact that average
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e¤ort and achievement of lowly talented "special" pupils are higher than
average e¤ort and achievement of lowly talented "normal" pupils.
Intuitively, this result can be explained as follows. On the one hand,
more lowly talented "special" pupils than lowly talented "normal" pupils get
a bad message in the equilibrium with negative discrimination, because also
those about whom the signal was wrong but who are matched with a biased
teacher are told to have only little talent. Those pupils choose lower e¤ort
than they would have done if the signal about their talent had been observed
by an unbiased teacher. But on the other hand, those lowly talented "special"
pupils about whom the signal was right and who would have gotten a bad
message anyway choose higher e¤ort than they would have done if they had
been sure to be told the truth. As long as the probability of the signals
being true is greater than one-half, this second e¤ect prevails.
Again, there are two countervailing e¤ects of the fact that a positive per-
centage of teachers is biased, a negative e¤ect on the e¤ort and achievement
of highly talented pupils and a positive e¤ect on the e¤ort and achievement
of lowly talented pupils. These two e¤ects add in exactly the same way as
in the equilibrium with favoritism. Thus, we get
Proposition 10: Like favoritism, negative discrimination has no ef-
fect on total average e¤ort. The decrease of average e¤ort exerted by highly
talented pupils and the increase of average e¤ort exerted by lowly talented
pupils exactly cancel out; and like favoritism, negative discrimination de-
creases total average achievement of those pupils who know themselves to be
potential victims of downward biased feedback.
As in the equilibrium with favoritism, the reason why the biased teachers
strategy has a negative e¤ect on average achievement of "special" pupils
is easy to see. Although the e¤ects of discrimination on average e¤ort of
highly and lowly talented "special" pupils just cancel out, the following holds:
Whereas the increase in average e¤ort of the lowly talented does only partly
translate into a corresponding increase in average achievement, the decrease
in average e¤ort of the highly talented is fully reected in a decrease of
average achievement.
Thus, not only the assumption that a fraction of teachers favors girls over
boys in math and science classes, but also the contrary assumption that this
fraction of biased teachers encourages girls too little in these subject areas
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can explain the observed fact that, on average, boys outperform girls in math
and sciences.
Favoritism and negative discrimination are identical in their implications
on behavior. Thus, also the ways in which the di¤erence in average e¤ort
and achievement between "special" and "normal" highly and lowly talented
pupils react to changes in the percentage  of biased teachers, signal quality
 and low talent k are the same in both equilibria.
Proposition 11: As in the case of favoritism, the following holds.
The absolute value of the di¤erence 4H in average achievement between
"special" and "normal" highly talented pupils (i) increases with the percent-
age of biased teachers, , (ii) increases with the signal quality  and (iii)
decreases with increasing talent k of the lowly talented. The di¤erence 4L
in average achievement between "special" and "normal" lowly talented pupils
(iv) decreases with the percentage  of biased teachers, (v) increases with
the signal quality  and (vi) with the talent k as long as k < 1
2
, whereas (vii)
it decreases with increasing k if k > 1
2
. (viii) The total di¤erence in average
achievement increases with  and  and decreases with growing k.
Proof: The proof is completely analogous to the one of Proposition
6 and shall therefore be skipped here.
5 Summary
In this paper, I have discussed the impacts of favoritism and negative dis-
crimination on the e¤ort and achievement distributions of pupils. Favoritism
is dened as the situation where a positive percentage of teachers has more
utility from the success of a given "special" group of pupils, for example girls,
than these pupils themselves. Thus, those teachers are, from the pupilsper-
spective, too easily contended. By contrast, the case of negative discrimina-
tion is the reverse situation, where the same percentage of teachers has less
utility from a "special" pupils success than the pupil herself. These teachers
are, from the pupils perspective, too strict.
The framework of analysis is a cheap talk game. In the equilibrium with
favoritism, the biased teachers always praise the "special" pupils while being
honest to the "normal" ones; and in the equilibrium with negative discrimina-
tion, they always reprimand "special" pupils. The "special" pupils anticipate
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the probability with which they are lied to but do not know for sure whether
or not their teacher is biased. Thus, they always partly internalize and partly
mistrust the feedback which they get if it could sensibly come from a biased
teacher.
I have found that although favoritism and negative discrimination are
based on completely di¤erent preferences on the side of the biased teachers,
their e¤ects are exactly the same. Without changing average e¤ort, they
compress the e¤ort distribution, so that the pupils who know themselves
to be potential favorites or potential victims of discrimination have less top
achievers and less bottom achievers among them than the "normal" pupils.
On average, lowly talented "special" pupils increase their e¤ort, while highly
talented ones choose lower e¤ort than they would if they could be sure that
the feedback which they received is truthful.
Consequently, while favoritism and negative discrimination enhance av-
erage achievement of lowly talented pupils, average achievement of highly
talented pupils decreases in virtue of biased feedback. Because only the ef-
fort of highly talented pupils translates fully into achievement while the e¤ort
of lowly talented pupils is always partly wasted, the impact of biased feed-
back on average achievement of highly talented pupils dominates: Favoritism
and negative discrimination decrease total average achievement.
Thus, both the assumption that some math and science teachers are al-
ways too fast in praising girls and the assumption that part of the math
and science teachers are always too reluctant to do so can explain the widely
observed fact that, on average, boys outperform girls in math and sciences.
Interestingly, the di¤erence in average achievement between "special"
pupils, i.e. girls, and "normal" pupils, i.e. boys, gets larger with increas-
ing quality of the signal which the teachers receive about their pupils talent.
Thus, there is a trade-o¤: On the one hand, increasing the signal quality, for
example with the help of more numerous or more reliable tests, increases the
reliability of honest feedback and therefore enhances e¢ ciency. But on the
other hand, the quality improvement of the signal leads to larger inequality
among pupils who are fairly treated and those who are not. Thus, any im-
provement of the signals on which the pupilsevaluation is based should be
accompanied by schemes such as an anonymisation of written exams so that
the probability of biased feedback is reduced.
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6 Appendix
Proof of the Lemma: First, the existence of the separating pure strat-
egy equilibrium in the case of favoritism shall be proved. The fact that both
fair and biased teachers always report their signal truthfully to a "normal"
pupil follows from the denition of their preferences. If "normal" pupils know
that they always get the true message, n (m) = p (s) will hold. Then, the
normal pupilspreferences will be identical to those of their teachers, so that
their teachers will always report their signal honestly.
It remains to be proved that the two types of teachers separate in their
behavior towards "special" pupils in the way described in the Lemma. Fa-
voritism is dened as the case where t = H > t (k). It follows immediately
from this assumption and the denition of t (k) that the biased teachers will
always praise a special pupil, no matter what the fair teachers would do.
Thus, the only remaining point to be proved is that fair teachers also
report their signal truthfully if they are matched with a "special" pupil.
Suppose the fair teacher reports his signal truthfully. Consider rst the
case where the signal which a fair teacher receives about a "special" pupils
talent is s = k. It will hold that sp (k) = p (k), because a "special" pupil
who gets a bad message will infer that the teacher must be a fair teacher
who has reported his signal truthfully. Consider now the case where the
fair teacher gets the signal s = 1 on the "special" pupils talent. It holds
that p (k) < sp (1) < p (1). If a "special" pupil gets a good message, her
subjective probability of being highly talented is higher than if she got a bad
message. But at the same time, this probability is also lower than in the
case of "normal" pupils, because the "special" pupil takes into account the
probability that the good message is a lie. It follows that sp (1) + sp (k) =
sp (1) + p (k) > 2p (k). The condition which implies negative feedback on
the side of fair teachers is sp (1)+sp (k) > 2p (k). Obviously, this condition
is always fullled in the case where the fair teacher has received a bad signal
about a "special" pupils talent. All other possible cases - including negative
discrimination - can be proved in analogous ways.
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is positive for all k < 1
2
and negative for all k > 1
2
; and (viii) follows from
(i)-(vii).
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